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In 2011, the performance artist Marni Kotak gave birth to her son Ajax in the Microscope 
Gallery in Brooklyn, New York, creating a work entitled The Birth of Baby X. Although it is 
not completely clear who attended the birth, it seems that Kotak opened her performance 
to visitors to the gallery with whom she had spoken in the weeks prior to the birth itself -- 
conversations that seem to have circulated around bodies, pregnancy, visibility, taboo, 
silence, birth, motherhood and art (Rochman 2011). It is a small gallery (‘microsized’, as its 
own publicity describes it, hence its name), and she certainly expected no more than fifteen 
people to be able to attend. In a highly controlled interior, specially heated, and dimly lit, in 
which she had inserted many of the props of birth -- a birthing pool, her grandmother’s bed, 
blue wallpaper, a carpet, a rocking chair, a freezer for the placenta, a shower, a hotplate, 
and so on -- her birth performance recreated, and continued, the ritual performance of 
normative birthing practices in the United States. Although the performance was intended 
for the ‘public’, there was barely space for her partner, midwife and doula, her birth 
installation, and a handful of visitors (Anderson 2011). So, despite considerable 
international press coverage about the first live birth to be performed in a gallery, The Birth 
of Baby X seems to have been rather sequestered. Although Kotak describes birth as an 
‘amazing live performance’, one that she claims remains routinely hidden from public view, 
her gesture towards its publication seems to have been an oddly intimate and private affair.  
Bodies, pregnancy, visibility, taboo, silence, birth, motherhood, art. The constellation 
of affects that the relations between these terms produce threads its way through many 
endeavours by artists, academics, practitioners and activists, over the last four decades, 
who have exerted sustained pressure within public discourses and institutions to open up 
the hidden labour of social reproduction, and the political, ethical and subjective 
dimensions of birthing and caring for the particular others we come to name as ‘children’. 
Motherhood has (re-)emerged in the last decade as ‘material’ for artistic and performance 
practice, and a viable subject of academic research. This work both recognizes and extends 
feminist perspectives that situate motherhood as a key site for the anxious psychosocial 
negotiations of identity, subjectivity, equality, ethics and politics. A wealth of texts, artworks, 
forums, networks and organizations have been seeded to support new discussions of 
maternal aesthetics, and new configurations of the ambiguous and yet ambivalent place of 
motherhood in contemporary life.[{note}]1 Yet the pressing need to develop a political 
aesthetics of motherhood, or to find a space of encounter for self-reflexive modes of auto-
ethnography that can reveal the daily struggles to maintain one’s sense of self while 
supporting the life of another, might not fully explain this renewed desire to perform, 
record, represent and spectate birth and motherhood. While these are vital elements in the 
ongoing work of countering the double bind of motherhood’s simultaneous ubiquity and 
dereliction in the public sphere, in this article I attempt to think through an ambivalent 
curiosity that underpins our desires for what I’m calling ‘maternal performance’ that I think 
is on the move in contemporary culture. To do this I shift the focus from the ‘liveness’ of the 
performance space, to the burgeoning culture of routinely recording and sharing live birth 
films on video-sharing platforms such as YouTube. Birth, once confined to highly regulated 
spaces and publics such as the home, the hospital and the medical textbook, has now 
emerged much more ‘dramatically’ into a shared digital domain, with hundreds of 
thousands of short films of live birth accessible to anyone with an internet connection, some 
with followings of many millions of viewers (Tyler and Baraitser 2013). This phenomenon 
raises questions about what it might mean to film ourselves giving birth, to watch others 
being birthed and to spectate our own birth mothers giving birth to ourselves, in public, 
with millions of other viewers. It asks us to theorize the meanings of watching and 
performing live birth.  
I want to explore these questions through revisiting an old psychoanalytic notion -- 
that of the ‘primal scene’. The primal scene (the fantasy of adult sexuality), and the related 
concept of primal fantasies (fantasies of castration and seduction), refer to the Freudian 
articulation of the role of infantile unconscious sexual and violent wishes in the structuring 
of psychosocial life. It is linked in particular to the psychic meaning of the loss of, or denial 
of, the material/maternal body as ‘source’ or ‘origin’. Although within both psychoanalytic 
theory, and feminist and queer theories of the maternal, the primal scene as a theoretical 
concept is radically out of date, a small number of scholars have begun to think again about 
the primal scene and primal fantasies, particularly in relation to the digital visual culture, 
and what it does to the question of origin.[{note}]2 The effects of the digital revolution on 
psychic and social life are now well documented, with the key themes being the ways that 
images are taken, viewed, stored, shared; the dissolution of the boundary between 
producer and consumer of images; the dematerialization of the observer, and the 
evisceration of the notion of the referent and index in audio-visual digital technologies 
(Jacobs 2015). As Amber Jacobs has argued, these changes characterize a specific ontology 
of the digital image, and prompt us to develop new theories of spectatorship and 
subjectivity. Where analogue technology such as photography relied on a belief in an 
unmediated event that fuels the fantasy that we can access a tangible source and origin of 
that event (that is, a primal scene), the digital image is a matrix of numbers that can be 
transmitted electronically and then interpreted into an image by a display device. Within 
the paradigm of the digital, Jacobs maintains, we no longer ‘see’ the image but experience, 
instead, the interpretation of data. This creates an indexical rather than representational 
relationship with the object (Jacobs 2015). Moreover, if, alongside the ontology of the 
digital image, we also think about the body in terms of ‘somatechnics’ -- Nikki Sullivan and 
Samantha Murray’s term for the body as both culturally produced, and as ‘techne’, in the 
sense of an intermingling of dispositifs and ‘hard technologies’ (Sullivan and Murray 2009) -- 
then the digitization and dissemination of the particular somatechnic event we call ‘birth’ 
might call on us to reconfigure our notions of place, scene, birth, origin and loss; our 
relations, that is, to the maternal.  
In arguing for the continued place of psychoanalysis in helping us understand issues 
to do with origin, reproduction and temporality, I want to ask both what psychoanalysis 
might have to offer to our understanding of performing and watching birth, and how a 
psychoanalytic configuration of the primal scene may itself need to change in relation to 
what Jacobs has called ‘digital primal fantasies’, produced by technologies that function 
through fungibility and loss-less-ness (Jacobs 2015). When we ask what is it that we desire 
to see when we perform, record and spectate birth, we open up a question about the birth 
of curiosity, and the need to know something about our origins. But if the very notion of 
‘origin’ shifts in relation to technologies of image capture, circulation and consumption, 
then we may also need to rethink the relation between the maternal and the drive to look 
and know.  
 
The Trouble with Birth 
 
Let’s face it -- it’s difficult to speak about birth. Birth is an aberration in many disciplinary 
spaces; it appears as an embarrassment in the academy, and oddly in psychoanalysis too, 
where Otto Rank’s theory of birth trauma was rejected by Freud early in the history of 
psychoanalysis, never to fully recover its place in the formation or functioning of 
psychosocial life (Rank 1924). Anxieties abound, in part, as Della Pollock has argued, 
because death always finds its way into the place of birth -- maternal death, stillbirth, 
miscarriage -- rendering silences in birth stories that nevertheless make their way into the 
narrative (Pollock 1999). Theoretical anxieties also haunt birth talk -- will birth embarrass us 
by tripping us into making pro-natalist statements celebrating the joys of parenting? Will it 
reveal a hidden unreconstructed liberalism, an implicit humanism or an old essentialism 
lurking within our theories, dragging us back to the link between women and bodies, nature 
and ‘dumb’ materiality? Or might it return us to the affects of horror, revulsion, hate, 
abjection and ultimately matricide, which cling to the maternal-feminine?[{note}]3 In Telling 
Bodies, Performing Birth, Pollock describes talking of birth as itself ‘performance’, ‘the artful, 
inventive, changing, interstitial, corporeal process’ (Pollock 1999: 8) in which birth’s 
meanings and values are negotiated. Performing birth through practices of narration 
‘authorizes new selves, alliances, and norms of relation, even as she reveals the deep 
impress of norms and expectations on herself’ (8). Here the risks of speaking of birth, 
including what Pollock calls the ‘commodification of disclosure’, are balanced against the 
potentialities for the emergence of maternal subjectivity, birth made meaningful, that is, 
through the performance of telling stories. The need to harness what is ‘not said’ within the 
‘said’ about birth expands what we can know and think, especially about some of 
feminism’s central questions. Birth reopens, in other words, questions of sexual difference, 
and the possibilities of conceiving of positive or generative difference, rather than 
difference marked as lack, loss and castration; it reopens questions of embodiment, 
materiality and matters of the flesh; and of intimacy, dependency, vulnerability and the 
ethics of care. It asks us to think again about kinship, in old and new forms; and the relation 
between social reproduction, class, ‘race’ and labour. The ‘performance’ of birth that 
renders birth meaningful, in other words, remains a feminist question, and performs the 
labour of reopening feminist questions.  
Of course, the meanings of birth are always on the move, and perhaps now more 
than ever, in the context of a ‘new visual culture’ of birth that has emerged in the last three 
decades. (Tyler and Baraitser 2013).[{note}]4 There has been a dramatic increase, for 
instance, in media representations of childbirth across a range of platforms, from cinema, 
reality television and television drama, through to online video-sharing platforms, 
pornographic film and fine art practice. And yet, as myself and Imogen Tyler noted in 2013, 
there is still very little feminist and no psychoanalytic scholarship on the implications of this 
new visual culture and its relationship to earlier feminist debates about the cultural taboo 
against the representation of birth (Tyler and Baraitser 2013). In attempting to make sense 
of the trouble with visualizing birth, we have drawn out a natal politics derived from Hannah 
Arendt’s work that emphasizes our condition as natals rather than mortals, as beings who 
are all born, rather than an ontology based on being-towards-death, the dominant 
phenomenological tradition in Western philosophy. In The Human Condition, Arendt stated 
that ‘natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of political thought’ (Arendt 
1958: 9). Politics, for Arendt, is the capacity to speak and act in the public sphere -- it occurs 
when people who are equals come together to discuss and debate their differences, without 
aim, and without knowing what the outcome of such debate will be. In this sense, politics is, 
by definition, always a new beginning, and is therefore linked with an originary beginning -- 
that of birth itself. Following Augustine (1998), Arendt argues that beginning is unique to 
human beings, and the beginning that birth inaugurates is the foundational fact of all 
thought, politics and action. Without the potentially transformational category of natality 
for Arendt, there can be no freedom, no social change and no human future. ‘Birth’ is a 
category, in other words, that brings ‘beginning’ into being. Although Arendt retains a 
problematic separation of the concept of birth (natality), from subjects who birth (mothers), 
and is always in danger of producing another account of ‘birth without women’, 
nevertheless, we have maintained that the new visual culture of birth also calls for a new 
natal politics. Without harnessing birth as a symbolic category that gives rise to freedom, 
social discourse, action and social change, contemporary visualizations of birth are in danger 
of becoming simply banal (Tyler and Baraitser 2013). Natality functions as a metaphor for a 
mode of sharing words and deeds in public space that allows for the appearance of 
transformational beginnings. This positions birth, and those who birth, at the centre of 
public life. 
 YouTube Birth 
 
Imagine two scenes, two women, encountering their birth. 
 
Scene one: A woman is in an attic full of junk. There are some videos in a box, and one is 
labelled ‘Birth’. She loads it into an old VCR player, and recognizes her own mother. She is 
birthing a baby whom she realizes must be her.  
  
Scene two: A woman is doing some research on YouTube birth, and clicks through to a 
home birth movie. She recognizes her own mother. She is birthing a baby whom she realizes 
must be her.  
 
If you enter ‘live birth’ into the search engine of the video-sharing platform YouTube you 
can access approximately 230,000 videos of women giving birth. Many are extremely 
graphic -- there is no censorship of the moment of crowning or the erotic enjoyment of 
childbirth on this site -- showing a much fuller spectrum of birth than on reality television. 
One of the most visited videos has had just under 50 million views. It shows a white 
Australian woman giving birth unassisted, in the open air, in a creek. Her partner appears to 
be videoing the birth, and their other three young daughters wander around and play in the 
water nearby. Although the video has some idealized, even idyllic aspects, it is also rather 
‘real’; mum is in considerable pain and discomfort in the last part of the labour; during the 
moment of birth she is rather frightened, and we are invited to witness the huge risk and 
precarity of birth for both mother and infant; and she is refreshingly open in her 
disappointment when she realizes it is ‘another girl’. Importantly, what becomes apparent, 
when you explore the site more fully, is that she is a trained ‘doula’ or birthworker, and she 
advertises her services in a related website.  
One early study of childbirth videos on YouTube by the feminist geographer Robyn 
Longhurst concluded that births she looked at were largely highly medicalized, white, 
middle-class and American (Longhurst 2009).[{note}]5 Rarely did one see the diversity of 
birthing practices across the world, or see anything go wrong, including the violence that 
childbirth can enact on the birthing body that leads to almost half a million women dying in 
childbirth worldwide every year (Alkema et al. 2016). However, by 2017 we can certainly 
track a number of ‘genres’ of birth on YouTube, each with a complex visual politics. There 
are births that are recorded explicitly for educational purposes, sponsored by private 
healthcare providers, state-led health campaigns and non-profit organizations; there are 
those made by partners of birthing women at home and distributed to closed audiences of 
family and friends, and there are other home movies that people have chosen to share with 
a general anonymous public; there are videos made by individuals in order to promote 
specific personal and political agendas such as the natural childbirth movement, unassisted 
birth, or hypnobirth, or by midwives to promote ‘safe birth’ in hospital settings; there are 
births recorded by companies whose purpose is to help ‘capture’ and sell back to you this 
‘momentous life event’ for you to keep alongside your wedding video, and your child’s first 
steps. This latter genre of birth video inserts birth into a heterochrononormative timeline -- 
birth, development, maturation, coupling, marriage, reproduction, the accumulation of 
wealth, its passing on, death. Although the majority of videos do appear to depict white 
women birthing in the global North, there are also many thousands of videos of African and 
Asian birthing women. What is involved, then, is the production and shoring up of national 
and cultural identities through birthing practices; the construction of discourses of classed 
and raced, able and disabled bodies; a complex politics of youth and aging, of power and 
gendered and sexual relations, and the relation between medicalization and notions of 
‘nature’. We need to remember that YouTube is owned by Google, and that despite the 
democratization of birth information and sharing of birth experiences between women, 
YouTube involves a highly mediated distribution of visual information. 
But to return to our question, how might we understand the particular desire to 
perform, record, distribute and spectate birth? Is it simply, along with ‘live death’, the last 
taboo, toppled by the weight of mass global communication brought about by the ubiquity 
of digital technologies? We watch because we can? If so, what is it that we see when we 
watch birth performed in this way? 
I began this section with two scenes. In the first scene in the attic, although anyone 
might have found the video, I would argue that the protagonist may still encounter the 
video as a communication with her, and her alone, an enigmatic communication, we would 
have to say, but a communication nevertheless, even if she may know that others have seen 
it and might see it in the future that does not include her. In the second scene, however, 
this fantasy is, we could say, ‘interrupted’. Here, the protagonist of this scene, along with 
potentially 50 million others, witness this birth. They witness it simultaneously, constituting 
a public. How does the publication of birth in this way change its meaning?  
In Relating Narratives (Cavarero 2000) Adriana Cavarero develops a philosophical 
account centred on ‘who’, rather than ‘what’ we are. She theorizes that each individual 
leaves behind a pattern, the residue of events and actions that can only be told in retrospect 
as ‘nothing but their life story’ (2). ‘The meaning’, she writes, ‘that saves each life from 
being a mere sequence of events … consists … in leaving behind a figure, or something from 
which the unity of a design can be discerned in the telling of the story’ (2). It is a story that 
begins with the uniqueness of our birth: ‘This and not another; a mother who, by giving 
birth to him, has generated the “seasons” of his entire existence, this existence and not 
another’ (11). However, we are not fully present at our birth. Being birthed to this and not 
another mother can only be told by someone else -- by the birth mother, or a father, a 
partner, friend, an institution perhaps, a midwife, a stranger who was passing. Cavarero 
argues that its telling corresponds to a primary desire on the part of the one whose story it 
is, which is the desire to hear the story of our birth that we cannot recall, working at the 
level of what Freud calls historical truth (Freud 1939), an event that occurs beyond the 
capacity for memory or recall, which we cannot narrate for ourselves.  
Birth points us, then, towards the fact that we are fundamentally dependent on 
others for our identity, our ‘who’. ‘Inside, we are all alike’ states Hannah Arendt (1978: 32). 
It is the co-incidence of being and appearing that allows us an ontology of the ‘who’ that 
constitutes each unique existent. Identity expresses itself -- it is the product of action, 
including the action that is a birth that is then narrativizable. We ‘are’ through appearing to 
others and therefore through the narrative of others. Hence our intense desire for the 
gathering up of ‘nothing but our life story’. The performance of birth stories is always 
displaced, for Cavarero, showing up a primary dependency on others.  
This may account for some of the curiosity that we have around watching birth; that 
the chance to ‘really see’ our birth appeals to this intense desire for the gathering up of 
‘nothing but our story’. And we could think about a mother who records herself birthing as 
she who makes a narrative, a visual representation, in anticipation of her child’s desire. 
When someone makes a video of our birth, perhaps this is the beginning of that narrative 
that comes to us from the outside, that generates the seasons of our entire existence, a 
reminder of our identity’s fundamental dependency.  
But when the narrative is shared with an amorphous public, when we shift from the 
woman in the attic, to the woman who witnesses her birth alongside 50 million others, then 
I think we are no longer watching our own birth. We are participating in the generation of a 
digital public around what was once understood as what Jacques Rancière calls an 
‘intolerable image’ (Rancière 2009). Rancière disputes the fact that our current condition is 
one of drowning in a torrent of images of horror, massacres and massive population 
transfers. Mass Media, he argues, carefully selects and orders images, eliminating from 
them anything that might exceed the simple superfluous illustration of their meaning:  
 
We do not see too many suffering bodies on the screen. But we do see too many 
nameless bodies, too many bodies incapable of returning the gaze that we direct at 
them, too many bodies that are an object of speech without themselves having a 
chance to speak. (96) 
 
One of the outcomes of birth as a form of mass spectacle is that, as well breaking the taboo 
on its representation, as well as offering a space for a mother to begin a narrative that is the 
child’s ‘who’, as well as reminding us of our fundamental dependency on others for our 
identity, it also generates nameless bodies that in this forum cannot be knitted into the 
narrative of an individual life. When we witness our own birth on YouTube I would suggest 
that we do not necessarily get any closer to what we really desire to see or know.  
 
The Sexual Theories of Children 
 
To come back to the question, what is it, then, we are looking for when we look at birth? 
James Strachey introduces Freud’s paper, On The Sexual Theories of Children (Freud 1908) 
in the following way:  
 
Here, then, the first readers of the present work were confronted, almost without 
previous warning, with the notions of fertilization through the mouth and of birth 
through the anus, of parental intercourse as something sadistic, and of the 
possession of a penis by members of both sexes. (Strachey 1908: 207) 
 
Freud proposes that birth -- the birth of a sibling (or the birth of another child’s sibling) -- 
prompts a child, who until this point is unconcerned about what comes to be understood as 
sexual difference, into a series of questions and investigations about where children come 
from, which give rise to a set of theories or fantasies about the sexes (figured in the specular 
field as what bodies have and don’t have), intercourse (how bodies get together and get 
inside one another), gestation (the visible swelling of a body) and birth (how a baby gets 
into a body, and from where it emerges). These theories do not remotely match what adults 
tell small children about their origins -- in Freud’s day it was that babies came from storks, 
and today parents in cultures in the global North are more likely to use ideas about a seed 
inside mummy’s tummy, that seed needing to meet another seed from a daddy or from a 
donor, mummy and daddy doing pleasurable things to make the seeds meet and grow, or 
mummies and mummies, daddies and daddies doing pleasurable things but the seeds 
meeting to grow elsewhere, of babies coming out of mummy’s vagina rather than her 
‘tummy’ and so on. Picture books on the facts of life for very small children attempt to get 
closer and closer to ‘reality’.  
However, Freud’s contribution was not that children will understand better if they 
know more of ‘reality’, but that whatever you tell them in early childhood they won’t 
believe, or at least they will attempt to make sense of it in their own way, through their own 
libidinal psychic struggles. Children develop their own theories, Freud postulated, through a 
mix of fact and fantasy, which are then suppressed in relation to the ‘reality’ they are told in 
order precisely to manage the disjunction between the two. It is not the problem of who 
does or doesn’t have a penis or breasts that is the issue for the child, but the disjunct 
relation between adult knowledge and infantile knowledge around the question of birth. 
Freud was particularly attuned to the fantasies of boy children -- their insistence, in his view, 
that girls and mothers have penises, their hope that they too can eventually birth babies 
based on their belief that if everyone has an anus then faeces and babies can come out of it, 
as well as their theories linking reproduction with the imagined sadistic violence of the 
primal scene itself. Despite the many difficulties with Freud’s position, what we might retain 
is simply the idea that something we call adult reality, proffered in our discussion here as 
the birth scene, mismatches a child’s theory of where babies come from -- one set of 
imaginings displaced in relation to another, and that this disjunction (whatever its content) 
is the instigator of the desire to know, what Freud calls ‘burning curiosity’, sublimated in 
thinking, creating and looking in later life. Scopophilia, from a Freudian perspective, is linked 
to the tantalizing unseen of the internal space of the maternal body for both men and 
women, and to the unanswered question of how a baby gets in there, and how it gets out.  
For the French psychoanalyst, Jean Laplanche, this relation between adult and child -
- the intergenerational encounter -- is crucial in instigating both infantile sexuality, and the 
binding of the drive that has to do with the production of unconscious life. Laplanche shifts 
the Freudian frame so that instead of assuming a human subject with an interiority 
governed by an aspect of the mind that remains unconscious (Freud’s notion of the other in 
me), for Laplanche the unconscious (the other in me) is precipitated through an encounter 
with another person’s other-in-them. The most important discovery of psychoanalysis for 
Laplanche is therefore the presence of the ‘other thing in me, and of the link between the 
other thing and the other person’ (Laplanche 1995: 663). In focusing on the link, Laplanche 
provides an account of psychic reality that resists being co-opted as either a version of 
internality (the child’s theory) or externality (the adult’s reality), but stages their relation as 
the condition for the very emergence of psychic reality. The link, Laplanche tells us, takes 
the form of a message that passes between adult and child. The message comes too early 
for the child to decode. It is sexual in its intent, a ‘real’ form of seduction, and not simply a 
seduction fantasy on the part of the child: 
 
‘Psychic reality’ is not created by me; it is invasive. In this domain of the sexual, there 
is too much reality at the beginning. (680) 
 
This third domain of reality, that is neither the child’s theory of sexuality nor the adult’s 
reality, is simply the reality of a message that passes from adult to child. Because the 
message is enigmatic and cannot deliver its content in a straightforward manner, it both 
fails and succeeds at one and the same time (665). For example, Freud, Laplanche tells us, 
makes an enormous effort to manufacture the primal scene from just two ingredients -- 
perceptual reality on the one hand, and the child’s fantasy on the other. But the reality that 
is not material, but also not purely subjective, has to do with the adult proffering of the 
scene, a kind of unconscious intent on the part of the adults, an offering, a performance we 
could say, indeed a seduction, through an invitation to look, to witness, to receive a 
message, regardless of what actually takes place. From this reading, the primal scene is not 
predicated on its content (we do not need to see or fantasize adult sexuality as such, from 
this perspective), but on the fact of something enigmatic, undecodable, being proffered for 
the child to witness. Laplanche, in other words, triangulates the primal scene not simply in 
the child’s mind, but in the reality of the adult’s enigmatic message to the child, at the same 
time as the adult is also caught up in the dyadic sexual relation with a third. The message 
says something like ‘I am showing you -- or letting you see -- something which, by definition, 
you cannot understand, and in which you cannot take part’ (666). The child, in the presence 
of the adult, must then translate the enigmatic messages, and this sets in motion the 
process of psychic binding. Importantly, for Laplanche, this encounter ‘remains’. It is not 
subject to developmental time. It is what is reactivated in the transference in an analytic 
scene, but also remains active as an element of adult sexuality, in which the too-much-ness 
of the present-tense encounter between the generations, a kind of sexual seduction and 
sexual trauma, is always at play. 
So, one reading of the desire to perform and spectate birth is that we are in a scene 
of address -- an address, described above, that is focused towards other adults -- that the 
child may witness or fantasize about, but crucially is also aimed also at the child. In other 
words, perhaps at some level we can say that a mother who chooses to film herself giving 
birth does so as an unconscious invitation to the future child, to look and to witness, as well 
as simultaneously trying to see something of her own original birth, to recreate a scene, that 
is, of unconscious proffering of adult sexuality that she has been invited to witness, and that 
sets psychic binding in train. And from the perspective of the spectator, when we end up 
watching birth, including our own birth, we are confronted, not so much with the mystery of 
origin, with the violence of the primal scene in the Freudian sense, but simply with the 
disjunction between adult and infantile knowledge. This is a temporal asymmetry between 
the generations that is experienced by the infant as an alarming present-tense encounter, 
one that instigates binding, narrative, discourse. To offer a narrative of the ‘who’ is 
underpinned, in other words, by an element of psychic life that does not develop, and 
perhaps never gets worked through -- the psychic reality that Laplanche triangulates, but in 
the Freudian sense is understood simply as curiosity. What we witness when we witness 
birth is the birth, not of ourselves, but of the origin of our curiosity.  
Furthermore, the psychoanalyst and painter Bracha Ettinger describes this temporal 
asymmetry between the generations as not only instigating curiosity, but also compassion 
(Ettinger 2010). Ettinger unpicks two major strands of psychoanalytic theorizing that she 
seeks to supplement, and that roughly give primacy to the paternal or maternal metaphor. 
On the one hand we have a Freudian/Lacanian trajectory that posits the subject as emerging 
out of a series of separations, retroactively gathered up as having been precipitated by birth 
and culminating with the crisis of Oedipus, in which the drive-directed subject is alienated in 
language and culture, constantly chasing its lost objects. On the other is an object-relational 
tradition that emerges out of the work of Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott, which 
understands the emergence of subjectivity through the intricate play of emotional life in the 
actual and fantasmatic early infant--carer relation. Ettinger seeks to move beyond this 
paternal/maternal binary altogether, in order to overcome the signification of the feminine 
in negative terms. Her project is part of the theoretical field that seeks to think sexual 
difference differently. To do so, Ettinger attends to the final stage of intrauterine life that 
she draws on for the figure she names the ‘matrixial’, a neologism that brings together the 
notion of the matrix with that of the maternal. She writes:  
 
The Matrix is modelled upon certain dimensions of the prenatal state which are 
culturally foreclosed, occluded or repressed. It corresponds to a feminine dimension 
of the symbolic order dealing with asymmetrical, plural, and fragmented subjects, 
composed of the known as well as the not-rejected and not-assimilated unknown, 
and to unconscious processes of change and transgression in borderlines, limits, and 
thresholds of the ‘I’ and the ‘non-I’ emerging in co-existence. (1992: 176--7) 
 
By referring to intrauterine life Ettinger is not positing that we think through the literal pre- 
birth experience of an individual and its effects on psychic life. Instead she is drawing out 
the potential of a model that has at least two subjective elements in play: a not-yet infant 
and a not-yet mother. Ettinger calls the space of encounter between the two the ‘matrixial 
borderspace’, where the emerging I of the infant in relation to what is not quite yet its non-I, 
the mother, ‘co-emerge and co-fade’ in a process she calls ‘borderlinking’ (Ettinger 2006). 
The matrixial is primarily a principle of severality (at least two) that supplements the phallic 
processes of separation, and is the basis for ethical encounter -- an encounter that does not 
destroy or paralyze the other, but allows the other to be, without intrusion, or knowing. 
Ettinger calls this principle ‘sexual difference’, in that it is a form of difference that is 
inscribed in the feminine (it is specific to gestation within a maternal body), that is not 
about establishing ways we are different from the other, but constitutes difference as a 
state of ‘wit(h)-ness’ (another neologism referring to both witnessing and being with). 
Subjectivity that is established in a state of ‘wit(h)-ness’ rather than castration is the 
feminine; the aspect of being with others that all birthed human subjects carry with them, 
and yet remains distinct from ‘merger’ or ‘symbiosis’. This locates the matrixial as the 
condition for sexual difference that refuses, or exceeds, binary logic.  
For Ettinger the infant meets the maternal subject through its own primary affective 
compassion, the figuration for which is the co-affective encounter between not-yet I and 
not-yet mother in the late stage of intrauterine life. Compassion allows what she calls 
‘primal psychic access to the other’ (Ettinger 2010: n.p). Like Laplanche, the encounter with 
the other is not so much a reaction but more like an arousal, akin to anxiety, an affective 
signal. Along with primary affective awe, these states mitigate early experiences of fear, 
guilt and shame. What this means is that alongside the primal fantasies of the primal scene, 
castration and seduction, that help us to understand intergenerational difference, loss and 
desire, Ettinger adds three new primal fantasies relating to the mother: the devouring 
mother, the not-enough mother and the abandoning mother. These are existential fears -- 
part of the condition of being human is to be anxious about being abandoned, invaded and 
withheld from. What is crucial, in her view, is to recognize that these are primal fantasies, 
distinct from narcissistic fantasies, and from actual abuses that some parents enact on their 
children. Primal fantasies have an important beneficial regulatory sense-giving function, and 
they allow the continuation of access to compassion and awe in adult life. We must be able 
to play with them, in order to come to terms with reality.  
If we draw on Ettinger to supplement the Freudian and Laplanchian account of the 
birth of curiosity above, then the desire to perform and spectate birth would include both 
elements -- it replays an originary encounter between adult and child that instigates a desire 
to know or decode the enigma of the primal scene, and it activates a primary capacity for 
compassion and awe that mitigates existential fears of being abandoned, invaded and 




Let’s go back to the difference between the two scenes. One was an analogue film or video 
tape, and the other was the circulation of birth through digital means, both in terms of 
production and consumption, creating a public that witnesses the performance of birth. As I 
noted above, digital images do not allude to the lost mother, as analogue images once did, 
but are, if you like, motherless, bodiless, with no referent. Amber Jacobs writes: ‘Nothing is 
lost in this lossless duplication’ (2015: 138). If nothing is lost, then with the digital comes the 
‘radical demoting of the concept of origin’ (138), and the psychic experience of loss in 
psychosocial individuation. This would appear to cut across the account of the primal scene 
as ‘birthing’ curiosity. The question becomes not where do I come from, as Cavarero 
suggested, and how do I get back there, but, as Jacobs puts it, ‘what am I and what can I be’ 
(138). If primal fantasies can now be thought about in their digital form then it suggests that 
what emerges from this is a new form of curiosity, and perhaps a new form of compassion. 
The digital infant, if you like, asks not just where do I come from, who am I, and what is my 
relation to the lost maternal body, but also what am I, and what can I do, as Jacobs explains. 
Watching one’s own birth then raises the question of ‘fungible subjectivity’-- what I can be 
through experiencing my non-uniqueness, my substitutability.  
If we loop back to The Intolerable Image, Rancière offers us the idea of the image 
that incites curiosity without foreclosure, without giving any answers. Reflecting on the 
history of images that have been used for political purposes by artists wishing to prompt the 
viewer into action, he notes how images that may be deemed socially intolerable (especially 
images of death, torture, horror or suffering, and here we can add birth) have been used by 
artists to raise awareness of the reality the image is supposed to be representing, with the 
hope of inciting a desire to act to change that reality. However, this representation--
knowledge--action sequence is based on a presupposition, as the image derives its power in 
the first place from a scenario that is always already political, a sensible regime in which 
some things are visible, thinkable, sayable, and others are not. Many artists have 
understood this, growing suspicious in the end of overt political intent in art making, 
instigating a critique of the spectacle and the notion that we may have direct access to 
‘reality’ through the image. Rancière, in ‘The Paradoxes of Political Art’, for instance, 
discusses the shift in Martha Rosler’s work, from the photomontage series Bringing the War 
Home: House Beautiful (1967--72) to her more recent series Bringing the War Home: House 
Beautiful, new series (2004), which juxtaposes war images with advertisements for petty-
bourgeois furniture and household goods, intended to reveal the realities of imperialist war 
that underlie the mass circulation of homogenous images of individual happiness (Rancière 
2010). The effect is not, as in the earlier work, produced by a calculable sequence -- artistic 
shock, intellectual awareness, political mobilization -- but through what Rancière calls ‘a 
process of dissociation’, a rupture between what is seen and what is thought, and between 
what is thought and what is felt, that cannot be anticipated or counted on in advance 
(Rancière 2010: 143). When we watch birth now, the scene, and its psychic representation, 
are already constellated in a host of ways. In returning now to what might be political about 
an image, especially an ‘intolerable image’, we need, Rancière maintains, to embrace the 
critique of representation—knowledge--action that we can see in Rosler’s later work, but 
without a politics of suspicion. Instead of repelling us, or inciting action or passivity, a 
political image, Rancière argues, is simply one that incites us to look again. Curiosity and 
attention are created through images that do not deliver their ‘message’ but instead ask us 
to ask the question ‘What is this?’, and by extension ‘What am I?’ We could say, then, that 
digital birth, as one of the last taboo performances of intolerable images to emerge into the 
public sphere, through its staging of the birth of curiosity with compassion (that is, without 
suspicion), enacts Rancière’s suggestion; through this practice of watching our desire to 
watch, or attempting to witness our own birth, the banality of the image is interrupted.  
It might be, then, that we can supplement our reading of the performance of birth 
by attending to what Bracha Ettinger has called ‘fascinance’ (Ettinger 2004) -- a kind of 
transformational and creative looking that is neither intrusive, nor transgressive, nor filled 
with horror and desire. Through a process that simply multiplies the questions that arise 
when we watch birth being performed, a form of generative looking -- fascinance -- is 
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